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This paper considers how exchange rates affect East Asian trade. The evidence indicates 
that exports produced within regional production networks depend on exchange rates 
throughout the region while labor-intensive exports depend on exchange rates in the 
exporting country. These results make sense since the majority of the value-added of 
processed exports come from  imported parts and components while most of the value-
added of labor-intensive exports comes from the domestic economy. Recent findings also 
indicate that imbalances between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the United 
States are a major outlier and that an appreciation of the PRC yuan (CNY) is necessary to 
reduce these imbalances. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
East Asia’s share of the world’s goods exports nearly doubled between 1982 and 2008, 
increasing from 13% to 23%. The share of People’s Republic of China (PRC) alone 
increased 10 times, from less than 1% to 9.4% during this period. Despite this explosion of 
exports, there were (until recently) only a few studies that investigated trade elasticities for 
the PRC (for instance, see International Monetary Fund [IMF] 2005). Since 2005, however, 
several papers have investigated the factors influencing trade in the PRC and the rest of 
Asia. The evidence indicates that exchange rate changes, by altering countries’ international 
price competitiveness, significantly affect their exports and imports. 
This paper summarizes some of these recent findings. Rather than attempting to make an 
incremental contribution to this literature, it steps back and looks at the big picture by 
enumerating some of the key lessons that have emerged from the existing studies.  
The evidence indicates that exchange rate effects differ between sophisticated products 
such as laptop computers and mobile phones produced within regional production networks 
and simple labor-intensive goods such as textiles and footwear produced primarily by 
domestic factors of production. In the first case, exchange rates appreciations throughout the 
region would cause a larger decrease in exports than appreciations in final assembly 
countries such as the PRC or Thailand alone. In the second case, appreciations in the 
exporting country would cause a large decrease in exports. These results make sense since 
the majority of the value-added of sophisticated processed exports comes from outside of 
the assembly country while the lion’s share of the value-added of labor-intensive exports 
comes from the exporting country itself. 
The findings presented here also highlight the unusual nature of trade imbalances between 
the United States (US) and the PRC. Before the crisis, the US ran large trade deficits with 
East Asia, oil-producing countries, and the rest of the world. Since October 2008, however, 
the US deficit with most regions has fallen but its deficit with the PRC  has remained 
intransigent. Evidence from a gravity model indicates that imbalances between the PRC and 
the US are a major outlier in the global economy. Results from dynamic ordinary least 
squares (DOLS) estimation indicate that, to reduce these imbalances, an appreciation of the 
yuan against the dollar is probably necessary. 
This paper is organized as follows. The next section considers how exchange rates affect 
trade within East Asian production networks. Section 3 considers the effect of exchange rate 
changes on labor-intensive exports from developing and emerging Asia. Section 4 
addresses issues related to trans-Pacific rebalancing. Section 5 concludes. 
2.  EAST ASIAN PRODUCTION NETWORKS AND 
EXCHANGE RATE CHANGES  
In Asia, production networks developed  in response to the 70%  appreciation of the 
Japanese yen against the dollar between 1985 and 1995. Japanese firms lost their price 
competitiveness, and responded by shifting labor-intensive assembly operations to other 
Asian countries. At first they channeled foreign direct investment (FDI) and intermediate 
goods to the Republic of Korea (hereafter Korea), Taipei,China, and other newly 
industrialized economies (NIEs). However, as the Korean won, Singapore dollar, and NT 
dollar appreciated, they relocated lower-end labor-intensive assembly to the PRC and the 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Firms in the Asian NIEs also began 
transferring factories to developing Asia, mainly ASEAN (Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand 
primarily) and the PRC. Consequently, “triangular trading patterns” developed in East Asia 
(see Gaulier, Lemoine, and Unal-Kesenci 2005). Higher skilled workers in Japan, Korea, and 
Taipei,China  produced  sophisticated technology-intensive  parts and components  and ADBI Working Paper 263    Thorbecke 
 
  2   
shipped them to the PRC and ASEAN for assembly by lower skilled workers and re-exported 
to the rest of the world. 
2.1  East Asian Production Networks 
The resulting cross border production networks involve complicated combinations of intra-
firm trade, arms-length transactions, and outsourcing (Kimura and Ando 2005). They are 
typically centered around multinational corporations (MNCs) in developed Asia that produce 
with the help of affiliates, subsidiaries, subcontractors, suppliers, and service providers in 
other parts of East Asia (see Borrus,  Ernst, and  Haggard  2000). These networks  have 
allowed MNCs to exploit comparative advantage by slicing up long production processes 
and allocating the production blocks created in this way throughout Asia. As Fukao et al. 
(2002) discussed, the production processes of an industry (e.g., the electronics industry) 
have been split into fragmented production blocks that can be located in different countries 
based on differences in factor endowments in the fragmented production blocks between 
developing, emerging, and developed economies in the region.  
Parts and components often flow back and forth several times between the countries for 
processing. The final assembly typically takes place by lower skilled workers in ASEAN and 
the PRC. In recent years, final assembly has become increasingly centered in the PRC. This 
is seen in Figure 1, which presents final electronic goods exports from East Asian countries. 
The figure shows that more and more processed exports have come from the PRC 
especially post 2000. 


















































































































Source: CEPII-CHELEM Database. 
Table 1 sheds further light on the PRC’s processing trade. Imports for processing refer to the 
parts and components such as hard disk drives that are imported into the PRC duty free and 
intended solely to produce goods for re-exports. Processed exports refer to final goods such 
as computers that are produced in this way. The table indicates that two-thirds of the imports 
for processing come from East Asia, while the US and Europe account for only 5% each. For 
processed exports, about 20% goes to East Asia, the US, Europe, and Hong Kong, China. 
Imports for processing come largely from East Asia while processed exports go throughout 
the world, so the PRC runs deficits of about US$100 billion with East Asia and surpluses of 
almost US$100 billion with Europe and of more than US$100 billion with the US and Hong 
Kong, China. ADBI Working Paper 263    Thorbecke 
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Table 1: The PRC’s Processing Trade, 2006–2009 




US  Europe  R.O.W  Total 
Imports for Processing (%)     
2006  15.08  19.04  10.51  15.89  2.63  2.11  5.23  4.99  24.52  100.00  
2007  15.24  18.75  10.65  16.11  2.40  1.98  4.93  5.03  24.91  100.00  
2008  15.63  18.07  10.26  16.20  2.28  1.62  5.20  5.72  25.01  100.00  
2009  16.95  16.96  9.73  15.53  2.18  1.32  4.80  5.51  27.03  100.00  
Processed Exports (%)     
2006  3.95  2.19  3.21  10.35  2.96  22.34  25.23  17.85  11.90  100.00  
2007  3.98  1.92  3.25  9.35  2.84  22.42  23.54  18.59  14.10  100.00  
2008  4.75  1.88  3.27  9.22  2.79  21.01  22.20  18.71  16.16  100.00  
2009  4.96  1.86  3.40  9.13  3.36  20.57  22.68  17.50  16.54  100.00  
Balance in processing trade (billions of US dollars)     
2006  -28.29  -50.01  -17.40  1.76  6.65  107.24  111.98  75.06  -18.12  188.87 
2007  -31.57  -57.18  -19.18  -1.63  8.73  131.18  127.25  96.29  -4.65  249.24 
2008  -27.07  -55.71  -16.72  0.99  10.19  135.76  130.20  104.67  14.46  296.77 
2009  -25.50  -43.72  -11.41  3.56  12.72  116.46  117.61  84.93  9.92  264.57 
Notes: ASEAN4 includes Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand. Europe includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. 
Source: China Customs Statistics.ADBI Working Paper 263    Thorbecke 
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2.2  The Impact of Exchange Rate Changes on Processing Trade 
Since much of the value added comes from other East Asian countries, one would expect 
that exchange rate changes in other countries in the region would affect the PRC’s 
processed exports. Ahmed (2009) and Thorbecke and Smith (2010) and Thorbecke (2010a) 
have presented evidence supporting this. We outline the main findings of each below.  
Ahmed (2009) employed an autoregressive distributed lag model and quarterly data over the 
1996Q1 – 2009Q2 period and disaggregated PRC yuan (CNY) exchange rate changes into 
those relative to East Asian countries and those relative to other countries. After 2003, he 
deflated PRC exports using the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) deflator for imports 
coming from the PRC and before 2003 he backcasted this series using the BLS deflator for 
imports coming from non-industrial countries. He reported that a 10% appreciation of the 
CNY relative to non-East Asian countries would reduce the PRC’s processed exports by 
17% and that a 10% appreciation in other East Asian countries would reduce the PRC’s 
processed exports by 15%. 
Thorbecke (2010a) also tested whether exchange rate changes in the supply chain countries 
affect processed exports. Exports were measured in US dollars and deflated using the US 
producer price index, the US consumer price index, and the Hong Kong, China export price 
deflator. Since many of Hong Kong, China’s exports are re-exports from the PRC, this last 
measure may be a useful proxy for PRC export prices. Encompassing tests indicated in 
every case that models including both exchange rates in supply chain countries and the 
PRC exchange rate are preferable to models including only the PRC exchange rate. Results 
using dynamic ordinary least squares estimation and quarterly data over the 1993Q4-
2008Q1 period indicated that a 10% appreciation of the CNY alone would reduce processed 
exports by 14% and a 10% appreciation of other East Asian currencies would reduce 
processed exports by 19%. These results imply that exchange rate changes in other East 
Asian countries have a large effect on the PRC’s processed exports. 
Thorbecke and Smith (2010) constructed a single integrated exchange rate variable to 
measure changes in the relative foreign currency costs not just of the PRC’s value-added 
but of the PRC’s entire output of processed exports. Exports were deflated using the BLS 
deflator for imports coming from non-industrial countries, the US consumer price index, and 
the Hong Kong, China export price deflator. Using DOLS estimation and an annual panel 
data set including exports to 33 countries over the 1992–2005 period, they reported that a 
10% appreciation throughout the region would reduce processed exports by 10%. 
The results of Ahmed (2009), Thorbecke (2010a), and Thorbecke and Smith (2010) thus 
indicate that exchange rates throughout Asian supply chain countries exert important effects 
on processed exports.
1
                                                 
1 Exchange rate changes can only generate expenditure-switching effects if there is sufficient pass- through of 
exchange rate changes to tradable prices. The IMF (2005) estimates that a 10% appreciation of the yuan raises 
the foreign currency prices of China’s exports by 5%.  Vigfusson, Sheets, and Gagnon (2007) found that 10% 
currency appreciations would raise the foreign currency prices of the Asian NIEs’ exports by 7% and of Japan’s 
exports by 5%. Thus there should be sufficient exchange rate pass-through for exchange rate appreciations in 
Asia to reduce exports. 
 One gets a different picture of the price competitiveness of the 
PRC's processed exports by taking account of exchange rate changes in other East Asian 
countries. Figure 2 shows the real effective exchange rate (REER) of the CNY, the real 
exchange rate in supply chain countries other than the PRC,  and  a single integrated 
exchange rate (IRER)  that is a weighted average of the CNY  exchange rate and the 
exchange rate in supply chain countries. The real exchange rate in supply chain countries 
was calculated by weighing real exchange rate changes in individual supply chain countries 
by each country’s value-added in the PRC's processed exports. The weights for the IRER 
were also determined by the proportion of the value-added coming from the PRC and from 
 ADBI Working Paper 263    Thorbecke 
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supply chain countries. Figure 2 shows that the CNY appreciated by 20% between 2005 and 
2010. The IRER, however, appreciated only by 8% over this period. In an arithmetic sense, 
the effect of the CNY appreciation on the IRER since 2005 has been almost exactly offset by 
the 20% depreciation of the Korean won and the 14% depreciation of the NT dollar over this 
period. 
Figure 2: PRC's Real Effective Exchange Rate, Weighted Exchange Rate for Supply 














































(PRC and Supply Chain Countries)
Yuan Real Effective  Exchange Rate
Real Exchange Rate in
Supply Chain Countries
Source: International Monetary Fund, Bank for International Settlements, and calculations by the author. 
This fact helps explain the puzzle that Cline (2010) discusses concerning why the PRC's 
bilateral trade surplus with the US did not narrow when the CNY appreciated between 2005 
and 2008. Part of the explanation, as Cline discussed, is that exchange rate changes affect 
trade with a lag. Another part of the explanation, though, is that depreciations in other East 
Asian supply chain countries offset much of the effect of the appreciation of the CNY. 
The IMF (2005) argued that imports for processing should vary one-for-one with processed 
exports. Imports for processing should thus flow elastically into assembly economies in 
response to an increase in the demand for processed exports in the rest of the world. IMF 
(2005) also noted that the price elasticity of imports for processing should be small because 
these goods are not produced domestically, resulting in little potential for import 
substitution.
2
In previous work Cheung, Chinn, and Fujii (2010), Marquez and Schindler (2007), and 
Garcia-Herrero and Koivu (2007) reported that an appreciation of the CNY is often 
associated with a decrease in imports from the rest of the world (i.e., the coefficient is wrong-
signed). The wrong sign could occur because an exchange rate appreciation will reduce the 
demand for processed exports and thus the demand for imports for processing.  
 
                                                 
2 However, the huge surpluses in processing trade that have emerged since 2005 suggest that firms in recent 
years have been able to source more intermediate goods from within the PRC. Thus the demand for imports for 
processing may have become more price elastic in recent years. 
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2.3  Impact of Exchange Rate Volatility 
While there is no evidence that an appreciation in the importing country would substantially 
increase imports for processing, there is both theoretical and empirical evidence indicating 
that exchange rate volatility between supply chain countries would deter processing trade. 
This effect arises because the service link cost for production blocks separated by national 
borders is an increasing function of risk and uncertainty, and exchange rate volatility 
increases risk and uncertainty. 
In a recent survey of Japanese MNCs, Ito et al. (2008) found that exchange rate stability 
between Asian currencies is essential for the uninterrupted flow of parts and components 
within regional production networks. 
Both Thorbecke (2008) and Hayakawa and Kimura (2009) presented econometric evidence 
that exchange rate volatility reduces the flow of parts and components within regional trade 
networks. Thorbecke (2008), using DOLS estimation and annual data over the 1985–2005 
period reported that exchange rate volatility caused a large decline in the flow of parts and 
components within East Asian production networks. Hayakawa and Kimura (2009), using a 
gravity equation and annual data over the 1992–2005 period, found that exchange rate 
volatility significantly reduced trade in intermediate goods within East Asian production 
networks. 
Carlos Ghosn, chief executive officer of Nissan Motor Corporation, recently commented that 
exchange rate volatility was harmful to fragmented production networks because it militated 
against long-term planning (see Crooks 2010). As a result, Nissan planned to shift 
production from Japan to dollar-linked economies such as the PRC to avoid mismatches 
between currencies in which costs are incurred and currencies in which revenues are 
generated.   
Interestingly, exchange rate volatility may not be as harmful to production networks centered 
on the US. Turkcan and Keskinel (2009) examined the impact of exchange rate volatility on 
fragmentation in the US auto parts industry. Using DOLS estimation over the 1996–2008 
period, they reported that exchange rate volatility has a positive but insignificant effect on US 
auto industry exports. Future research should investigate whether exchange rate volatility 
has different effects on production networks centered in East Asia and those centered in the 
US. 
3.  LABOR-INTENSIVE EXPORTS FROM EAST ASIA 
While East Asian economies export large volumes of sophisticated processed exports, they 
also exported almost US$400 billion in labor-intensive manufacturing exports in 2008. These 
goods tend to be produced largely with domestic inputs, and much of the value-added is 
supplied domestically. For instance, Koopman, Wang, and Wei  (2008)  reported that the 
PRC’s value-added in electronic computers was less than 5% in 2002, while its value-added 
in wearing apparel was almost 70%. 
Figure 3 shows exports of labor-intensive manufacturing goods from East Asian countries 
and regions to the world. Labor-intensive exports are defined to include carpets, clothing, 
fabrics, furniture, knitwear, leather, and yarns. The main exporters of these goods are the 
labor-abundant developing and emerging economies such as the PRC, Indonesia, and Viet 
Nam. Exports from capital-abundant developed economies such as Japan are miniscule, as 
one would expect. One would expect significant competition between Asian countries in 
exporting labor-intensive goods to third markets. Profit margins for these goods are thin (see 
Ito et al. 2008), and exporters will face pressure to pass through exchange rate changes into 
import prices.  ADBI Working Paper 263    Thorbecke 
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Figure 3a: Value of Labor-Intensive Manufacturing Exports from East Asian Countries 
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Thorbecke and Zhang (2009) and Thorbecke (2010b) found labor-intensive exports from the 
PRC and ASEAN countries to be very sensitive to both exchange rates in the exporting 
country and to exchange rates in other countries exporting labor intensive exports to third 
markets. In both cases, exports were measured in dollars and deflated using BLS price 
deflators for the categories of labor-intensive exports employed. Using DOLS estimation and 
an annual panel data set including exports to 30 countries over the 1987–2006  period, 
Thorbecke and Zhang (2009) reported that for the PRC a 10% appreciation of the CNY 
would reduce labor-intensive exports by about 17% and a 10% depreciation among 
competing countries will decrease exports by about 9%. Using  DOLS estimation and an 
annual panel data set including exports to 25 countries over the 1983–2007  period, 
Thorbecke (2010b) found that for ASEAN countries, a 10% appreciation in the exporting 
country would reduce that country’s labor-intensive exports by about 20% and a 10% 
depreciation among competing countries would decrease the ASEAN country’s exports by 
about 12%. These results support the claim that profit margins for these goods are thin, and 
that there is extensive competition between labor-abundant countries in exporting to third 
markets. 
Figure 3 shows that the PRC is the largest exporter of labor-intensive goods. There is a 
close correspondence between labor-intensive exports and the PRC customs regime called 
“ordinary” exports.  As Gaulier, Lemoine, and Unal-Kesenci  (2005)  discussed, ordinary 
exports are produced primarily using local PRC inputs. Since the PRC is a labor-abundant 
country, ordinary exports are largely labor-intensive goods. Feenstra and Wei (2010) report 
that the largest category of ordinary exports is textiles. 
Table 2 disaggregates the PRC’s ordinary trade by country and region. About 25 of ordinary 
imports come from East Asia, about 15 from Europe, less than 10 from the US, and more 
than 40 from the rest of the world. Many of the ordinary imports coming from the rest of the 
world in recent years have been commodities. The largest recipient of the PRC’s ordinary 
exports have been the US and Europe. The PRC runs surpluses with the US and Europe in 
ordinary trade and deficits with Asia. With the world as a whole, it ran a slight deficit overall 




Table 2: The PRC’s Ordinary Trade, 2006–2009 




US  Europe  R.O.W  Total 
Ordinary Imports (%)     
2006  8.03   4.55   6.01   12.66   1.52   0.93   8.50   15.79   42.02   100.00  
2007  7.05   4.26   6.43   11.77   1.24   1.06   8.41   15.78   44.01   100.00  
2008  6.15   3.51   5.46   10.88   1.33   1.00   8.21   13.95   49.49   100.00  
2009  6.47   3.73   6.22   11.75   1.21   0.69   9.39   15.95   44.58   100.00  
Ordinary Exports (%)     
2006  5.47   2.11   5.09   8.98   1.67   7.71   16.60   17.91   34.46   100.00  
2007  5.48   1.90   5.19   7.76   1.97   6.40   14.90   18.70   37.72   100.00  
2008  5.95   1.77   5.72   7.57   1.75   5.17   14.13   19.15   38.77   100.00  
2009  4.24   1.55   6.19   7.80   1.64   6.04   14.84   18.77   38.92   100.00  
Balance in normal trade (billions of US dollars)     
2006  -3.96   -6.37   1.15   -4.76   1.89   28.97   40.81   21.94   3.46   83.14  
2007  -0.69   -8.04   0.36   -8.65   5.29   29.89   44.19   33.05   14.47   109.87  
2008  4.18   -8.37   6.64   -12.11   3.97   28.55   46.60   47.00   -26.55   89.91  
2009  -12.11   -11.74   -0.47   -21.44   2.20   28.30   28.46   14.24   -32.04   -4.59  
 
Notes: ASEAN4 includes Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand.  Europe includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. 
Source: China Customs Statistics. ADBI Working Paper 263    Thorbecke 
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Many have found that ordinary exports are sensitive to appreciations in the CNY. Marquez 
and Schindler (2007), for instance, used ordinary least squares and monthly data over the 
January 1997 to July 2006 sample period. To avoid using proxies for PRC trade prices, they 
employed the share of the PRC’s imports relative to world imports as their left hand side 
variable. They also employed the International Monetary Fund, Bank for International 
Settlements, and Federal Reserve Board measures of the REER. They found that, 
depending on the exchange rate measure, a 10% appreciation of the CNY would have 
reduced the PRC’s ordinary exports by between US$51 and 63 billion in 2006.  
Ahmed (2009) employed an autoregressive distributed lag model and quarterly data over the 
1996Q1  –  2009Q2 period. He deflated PRC exports by using the US Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) deflator for imports coming from the PRC after 2003 and by backcasting this 
series before 2003 using the BLS deflator for imports coming from non-industrial countries. 
In one of his preferred specifications, he included foreign consumption as an explanatory 
variable. In this case, he reported that a 10% appreciation of the CNY would reduce the 
PRC’s ordinary exports by 19%. 
Cheung, Chinn, and Fujii (2010) employed DOLS techniques and quarterly data over the 
1993Q3 – 2004Q2. They deflated PRC exports using the US producer price index (PPI) for 
finished goods, the price indices constructed by Gaulier, Lemoine, and Unal-Kesenci (2006, 
hereafter GLÜ-K), and the Hong Kong, China unit value index. They reported that a 10% 
appreciation of the CNY would reduce the PRC’s ordinary exports by between 3% and 6%.  
Thorbecke and Smith (2010) also employed DOLS estimation and an annual panel data set 
including exports to 33 countries over the 1992–2005 period. They deflated exports using 
the BLS deflator for imports coming from non-industrial countries, the US consumer price 
index, and the Hong Kong, China export price deflator. They found that a 10% appreciation 
of the CNY would reduce ordinary exports by about 12%. 
While the results indicate that an appreciation of the CNY should reduce ordinary exports, 
the results are ambiguous for ordinary imports. Cheung, Chinn, and Fujii (2010) deflated 
PRC imports using the US PPI, the GLÜ-K index, and the Hong Kong, China unit value 
index. Employing DOLS and quarterly data over the 1993Q3 – 2004Q2, they reported that 
an appreciation of the CNY was associated with a decline in ordinary imports (i.e., the 
coefficient had the wrong sign). Marquez and Schindler (2007) examined the share of the 
PRC’s imports relative to rest of the world imports. They found that a 10% appreciation of 
the CNY caused ordinary imports to increase by about US$15 billion. These conflicting 
results could arise because some ordinary imports are used to produce goods for re-exports. 
An exchange rate appreciation that reduces the PRC’s exports will reduce the demand for 
these imported inputs.  
To correct for this bias, Thorbecke (2009, 2010c) examined the imports of final consumption 
goods into East Asian countries. These goods are intended primarily for the domestic market 
rather than for re-export. Data on consumption goods imports were measured in US dollars 
and deflated using the BLS price indices for consumption goods. Using DOLS techniques 
and quarterly data on consumption goods imports from 27 countries over the 1985–2006 
period, Thorbecke (2009) found that a 10% appreciation of the CNY would increase the 
PRC’s consumption imports by about 13%. In follow up work focusing only on countries that 
provided at least one of consumption imports into individual East Asian countries, Thorbecke 
(2010c) reported exchange rate appreciations in other East Asian countries also raised 
consumption imports.
3
                                                 
3 Using this new specification, there is no longer evidence that an appreciation of the CNY will increase the 
PRC’s consumption imports. One reason why the PRC’s exchange rate elasticity may no longer be statistically 
significant is that only 11 countries are included in the sample of countries exporting to the PRC. These include 
the US and several Asian countries whose currencies were closely linked with the dollar for many years. Since 
 Thus an appreciation of the currency that raises consumers’ 
purchasing power should increase the demand for consumption imports.  ADBI Working Paper 263    Thorbecke 
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4.  EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANS-PACIFIC 
REBALANCING
4
Before the crisis, the US ran large trade deficits with East Asia, oil-producing countries, and 
the rest of the world. Since October 2008, however, the US deficit with most regions has 
fallen but its deficit with the PRC has remained intransigent. This fact is documented in 
Table 3. The table shows exports, imports, and the trade balance between the US and the 
rest of the world before and after the Lehman Brothers fall in September 2008. Exports and 
imports both exhibited sharp drops beginning in October 2008. The sample is thus divided 
into the year before the crisis (October 2007–September 2008), the first year after the 
Lehman shock (October 2008–September 2009), and the second year after the Lehman 
shock (October 2009–September 2010). For non-East Asian countries, the deficit fell by 76% 
during the post-crisis period and equaled US$227 billion between October 2008 and 
September 2009. For the PRC, it fell by less than 12% and equaled US$237 billion between 
the fourth quarter of 2008 and the third quarter of 2009. Columns (7) through (9) indicate that 
this pattern is continuing, with the PRC making up 44% of the US deficit during the first year 
after the Lehman shock and 42%  during the second year after Lehman.
 
                                                                                                                                                  
the CNY was pegged to the dollar for most of the sample period, there might not have been enough exchange 
rate variation in the data to give the tests sufficient discriminatory power.   
 




Table 3: Exports, Imports, and Trade Balance between the US and other Countries and Regions before and after the Lehman Brothers 
Shock, (Billions of US dollars) 
    Year before the Lehman Brothers 
Shock 
First Year after the Lehman Brothers 
Shock 
Second Year after the Lehman 
Brothers Shock  
Country         




to the US 
(2) 
Imports 









to the US 
(5) 
Imports  









to the US 
(8) 
Imports 










337  71  266  300  63  237  348  86  262 
Rest of 
East Asia 





1,581  1,097  484  1,126  899  227  1,300  1,018  281 
World  2,150  1,298  852  1,594  1,059  535  1,843  1,224  618 
Notes: The year before the Lehman Brothers shock is from October 2007 to September 2008. The first year after the Lehman Brothers shock is from October 2008 to September 2009. 
The second year after the Lehman Brothers shock is from October 2009 to September 2010. Rest of East Asia includes Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Taipei,China.  
Sources: US Census Bureau (Available at: http://www.census.gov/) ADBI Working Paper 263    Thorbecke 
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Thorbecke and Komoto (2010) highlighted the unusual nature of the PRC’s exports to the 
US. They estimated a gravity model that sought to explain trade between 30 countries over 
the 1988–2007 period using  income in the exporting and importing countries, the real 
exchange rate, distance, a common language dummy, importer and exporter fixed effects, 
dummy variables for Mexico and Canada, and a time trend.  Exports were measured in 
dollars and deflated using the consumer price index. They found that the PRC exports to the 
world and the US imports from the world in 2007 were both much more than the model 
predicted. They also found that in the PRC’s case the main outlier was exports to the US 
and in the case of the US, the main outlier was imports from the PRC. The PRC’s exports to 
the US in 2007 were US$200 billion more than the model predicted. These results are 
presented in Figure 4. 
Figure 4a: The PRC's Predicted and Actual Exports, 2007 
Figure 4b: US Predicted and Actual Imports, 2007 
Notes: Predicted exports or imports represent the sum of predicted exports or predicted imports from 31 countries based on a 
gravity model. The gravity model includes income in the exporting and importing countries, the real exchange rate, distance, a 
common language dummy, importer and exporter fixed effects, dummy variables for Mexico and Canada, and a time trend as 
explanatory variables. AUS=Australia, AUT=Austria, BRZ=Brazil, CAN=Canada, DNK= Denmark, ESP= Spain, FRA=France, 
FIN=Finland, GER=Germany, IDN=Indonesia, IND=India, IRL=Ireland, ITA=Italy, JPN= Japan, KOR=Korea, KSA=Saudi 
Arabia, MEX=Mexico, MYS=Malaysia, NLD= Netherlands, NOR=Norway, PHL=Philippines, POL=Poland, PRC= People’s 
Republic of China, SGP= Singapore, SWE=Sweden, SWZ= Switzerland, TAI=Taipei,China, THA=Thailand, TUR=Turkey, 
UK=United Kingdom, US= United States  
Source: Thorbecke and Komoto (2010). 
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The massive imbalances between the PRC and the US have been financed by the 
accumulation of US Treasury securities (external reserves) by the People’s Bank of China 
(PBoC). Many argue that continued foreign reserve accumulation by the PBoC is 
unsustainable because it produces an increasingly inefficient allocation of resources. Both 
private and social rates of return are much higher for investments in the PRC economy than 
for investments in US securities.  For instance, investing in education would pay high 
dividends by helping PRC  firms to assimilate new technologies and move up the value 
chain. 
A related issue to the PRC’s foreign reserve accumulation is whether sterilization measures 
by the PBoC have worked well. If not, maintaining the current exchange rate arrangement 
will prove problematic. Concerning this issue, Ouyang, Rajan, and Willett (2010) conclude 
that the PBoC’s sterilization was effective and the PRC played the role of the reserve sink, 
like Germany in the Bretton Woods system. On the other hand, Wang (2009) found that the 
share of sterilization was only 43% if M2 rather than the monetary base is examined. In 
addition, from the results of recursive estimation, both papers agree to the view that the 
sterilization has been getting more difficult year by year.  
If  the PRC were to stop accumulating additional reserves and invest in the domestic 
economy, its currency would appreciate. How would this affect trans-Pacific imbalances? 
Cheung, Chinn, and Fujii (2010), using DOLS methods and quarterly data over the 1993 to 
2006 period, report that a 10% appreciation of the CNY would reduce the PRC’s exports to 
the US by between 8% and 20%. Thorbecke (2006), using DOLS and Johansen maximum 
likelihood estimation (MLE) and quarterly data over the 1988 to 2005 period, finds that a 
10% appreciation of the CNY would reduce the PRC’s exports to the US by between 4% and 
14%. An appreciation of the CNY against the US dollar should thus help reduce imbalances 
between the two countries. 
If the PRC does not let the CNY appreciate and if the imbalances prove unsustainable, how 
else would adjustment occur? Cheung, Chinn, and Fujii (2010) and Thorbecke (2006) both 
reported that a fall in income in the US would not affect the PRC’s exports. One explanation 
for this is the “Walmart effect” discussed by Petri and Plummer (2009). They argued that 
since PRC exports are at low price points within product categories, the demand for PRC 
imports may increase even as overall demand shrinks. The idea that there is a tenuous 
relationship between PRC exports and US income is supported by recent experience. The 
CNY  remained tightly pegged to the US  dollar, and a once-in-a-generation crisis barely 
reduced either the PRC’s exports to the US or its trade surplus. A real appreciation of the 
CNY is thus probably necessary to reduce imbalances between the PRC and the US. 
If a real appreciation cannot be achieved by nominal exchange rate adjustment, it is likely 
that it will be achieved by inflation in the PRC and deflation in the US. This would be painful 
for both countries. 
5.  CONCLUSION 
This paper has surveyed recent research on the relationship between exchange rates and 
trade in Asia. The results indicate that exports produced within regional production networks 
depend on exchange rates throughout East Asia. The continuous flow of parts and 
components within regional production networks also depends on relative  exchange rate 
stability in the region. Labor-intensive exports depend on exchange rates in the exporting 
country. Finally, imbalances between the PRC and the US are sensitive to changes in the 
CNY/US dollar exchange rate.  
These results indicate that, while Asian economies cooperate in regional production and 
distribution networks, they also compete in the export of labor-intensive manufacturing 
goods to third markets. This competition makes individual countries in Asia resistant to ADBI Working Paper 263    Thorbecke 
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allowing their currencies to appreciate unilaterally relative to the currencies of neighboring 
currencies. However, if trans-Pacific imbalances are unsustainable, exchange rates will have 
to appreciate eventually. 
In this case it would be desirable for East Asian currencies to appreciate in concert against 
external currencies while maintaining relative stability vis-à-vis each other. This outcome 
would benefit East Asia in several ways. Relative stability in intra-regional exchange rates 
would facilitate  the flow of parts and components within regional production networks. 
Appreciations would allow Asian consumers to import more from the rest of the world and 
give Asian firms an incentive to produce for domestic markets.  Concerted appreciations 
would  also  help prevent unpleasant outcomes such as beggar-thy-neighbor policies and 
excessive reserve accumulation. 
How could Asia achieve a concerted appreciation? A crucial first step would be for the PRC 
to keep making progress towards its self-proclaimed goal of adopting a regime characterized 
by a multiple-currency, basket-based reference rate with a reasonably wide band. In this 
case, the huge surpluses generated within East Asian production networks would cause 
currencies in the region to appreciate together.  Market forces could then allocate these 
appreciations across supply chain countries as a function of the size of their surpluses in 




Ahmed, S. 2009. Are Chinese exports sensitive to changes in the exchange rate? 
International Finance Discussion Papers No. 987. Federal Reserve Board. 
Borrus, J., D. Ernst, and S. Haggard. 2000. International Production Networks in Asia. 
London and New York, NY: Routledge. 
Cheung, Y., M. Chinn, and E. Fujii. 2010. China’s current account and exchange rate. In 
China's Growing Role in World Trade, edited by R. Feenstra and S. J. Wei. Chicago, 
IL: University of Chicago Press.  
Cline, W. R. 2010. Estimating the impact of the exchange rate on the trade balance and jobs. 
Real Time Economic Issues Watch, Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, www.piie.com/realtime/?p=1806, 1 November, Washington DC. 
Crooks, E. 2010. Nissan to shift output to dollar economies. Financial Times. 21 November. 
Feenstra, R., and S. J. Wei. 2010. Introduction. In China's Growing Role in World Trade 
edited by R. Feenstra, S.J. Wei, forthcoming. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Fukao, K., H. Ishido, K. Ito and Y. Yoshiike (2002). Vertical intra-industry trade and foreign 
direct investment in East Asia. Asian Development Bank Institute Research  Paper 
No. 51. Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute.  
Garcia-Herrero, A., and T. Koivu. 2007. Can the PRC trade surplus be reduced through 
exchange rate policy? BOFIT Discussion Papers 6. Helsinki: Bank of Finland Institute 
for Economies in Transition. 
Gaulier, G., F. Lemoine, and D. Unal-Kesenci. 2005. China’s integration in East Asia: 
production sharing, FDI, and high-tech trade. CEPII Working Paper No. 2005-09, 
Centre D’Etudes Prospectives et D’Information Internationales. 
Gaulier, G., F. Lemoine, and D. Unal-Kesenci. 2006. China’s emergence and the 
reorganization of trade flows in Asia. CEPII Working Paper No. 2006-05, Centre 
D’Etudes Prospectives et D’Information Internationales. 
Hayakawa, K., and F. Kimura. 2009. The effect of exchange rate volatility on international 
trade in East Asia. Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 23 (4): 395–
406. 
IMF. 2005. Asia-Pacific Economic Outlook. Washington DC: IMF.  
Ito, T., S. Koibuchi, Y. Sasaki, K. Sato, J. Simizu, K. Hayakawa, and T. Yoshimi. 2008. 
Currency invoicing and foreign exchange risk management: A case Study of 
Japanese Firms. RIETI Discussion Paper 08-J-009. Tokyo: Research Institute of 
Economy, Trade and Industry.  
Kimura, F., and M. Ando. 2005. Two-dimensional fragmentation in East Asia: Conceptual 
framework and empirics. International Review of Economics and Finance 14(3): 317–
348. 
Koopman, R., Z. Wang, and S. Wei. 2008. How much of PRC exports is really made in 
China? Assessing domestic value-added when processing trade is pervasive. NBER 
Working Paper 14109. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Marquez, J., and J. Schindler. 2007. Exchange rate effects on China’s trade. Review of 
International Economics 15(5): 837–853. ADBI Working Paper 263    Thorbecke 
 
17 
Ouyang, A., R. Rajan, and T. Willett. 2010. China as a reserve sink: The evidence from 
offset and sterilization coefficients. Journal of International Money and Finance 29(5): 
951–972. 
Petri, P., and M. Plummer. 2009. The triad in crisis: what we have learned and how it will 
change global cooperation. Journal of Asian Economics 20(6): 700–713. 
Thorbecke, W. 2006. How would an appreciation of the renminbi affect the US trade deficit 
with China? The B.E. Journal in Macroeconomics 6(3): 1–15. 
———. 2008. The effect of exchange rate volatility on fragmentation in East Asia: evidence 
from the electronics industry. Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 22(4) 
535–544. 
———. 2009. Can East Asia be an engine of growth for the world economy? RIETI 
Discussion Paper 09-E-006. Tokyo: Research Institute of Economy, Trade, and 
Industry.  
———. 2010a. Investigating the effect of exchange rate changes on China’s processed 
exports. Forthcoming in the Journal of the Japanese and International Economies. 
———. 2010b. An empirical analysis of ASEAN’s labor-intensive exports. Journal of Asian 
Economics 21(6): 505–513. 
———. 2010c. How elastic is East Asian demand for consumption goods?  Forthcoming in 
the Review of International Economics.  
———. 2010d. The effect of a renminbi appreciation on US/China trade imbalances. 
Available at www.voxeu.org.  
Thorbecke, W., and H. Zhang. 2009. The Effect of exchange rate changes on China’s labor-
intensive manufacturing exports. Pacific Economic Review, 14(3): 389–409.  
Thorbecke, W., and G. Komoto. 2010. Investigating the effect of exchange rate changes on 
trans-pacific rebalancing. In Trans-Pacific Rebalancing, edited by B. Bosworth and M. 
Kawai ,forthcoming. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. 
Thorbecke, W., and G. Smith. 2010. How would an appreciation of the RMB and other East 
Asian currencies affect China’s exports? Review of International Economics 18(1): 
95–108. 
Turkcan, K., and M. Keskinel. 2009. The impact of exchange rate volatility on fragmentation: 
evidence from the US auto parts industry. Unpublished manuscript, Loyola 
Marymount University. 
Vigfusson, R., N. Sheets, and J. Gagnon. 2007. Exchange rate pass-through to export 
prices: assessing some cross-country evidence. International Finance Discussion 
Paper 902. Washington, DC: Federal Reserve Board.  
Wang, Y. 2009. An estimation of the effectiveness of China’s capital controls and 
sterilizations. International Trade and Investment Series Working Paper 09008. 
Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. 
 
 